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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent empirical work has shown that many listed companies have a complex ownership 
structure that involves multiple large shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Agency conflicts arising from such ownership structures are 
different from those observed in widely held firms or firms solely controlled by a large 
shareholder. Consequently, the market value of firms with multiple blockholders should differ 
from that of other firms. Laeven and Levine (2007) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) validate 
this intuition. Moreover, they show that firm value is significantly affected by the distribution 
of the stakes across large shareholders: valuation decreases as the control of the largest 
shareholder becomes less contestable. 
Beyond this evidence, little is known about the interactions between large shareholders 
who may have close ties. This is particularly true if they are signatories to a shareholder 
agreement. Shareholder agreements are explicit contracts by which contracting parties grant 
each other  special financial rights and often organize effective control over the firm. In 
European countries
1, the use of shareholder agreements is far from anecdotal: Roosenboom 
and Schramade (2006) notice that over the period 1993-1999 26.4% of French IPOs featured 
a shareholder agreement while Volpin (2002) observes that an agreement is in force in 15% of 
his sample of Italian listed companies. 
Such agreements are extensively used by venture capitalists in order to regulate their 
relations with owner-managers of growing firms (see for instance Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2003). However, for listed companies, the literature looking into the “black box” of 
shareholder agreements is scarce: most studies only note the existence of agreements without 
precisely analysing their clauses. In this paper, I try to fill this gap and provide new insights 
about the prevalence of shareholder agreements, the clauses contained in such agreements, 
and the characteristics of the contracting shareholders. 
Theoretical predictions about shareholder agreements have been limited. On one hand 
these agreements can be analysed as efficient coordination mechanisms (Chemla et al., 2007) 
that provide the contracting parties with (1) the incentives to make ex-ante investments and 
(2) a protection against ex-post adverse wealth transfer. On the other hand they can also be 
viewed as means of securing control over the firm and hence impeding value-enhancing 
takeovers. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) stipulate a negative “coalition formation effect”. 
                                                 
1 I am not aware of any paper that describes the use of shareholder agreements in North American listed 
companies.    4
In their model, shareholders compete to form coalitions. In cases where the stakes of the 
shareholders are unevenly distributed, a controlling coalition can emerge with a small number 
of cash flow rights. In such situations, shareholders of the controlling coalition are prone to 
extract private benefits at the expense of non-participating shareholders. Analysing this effect 
is not necessarily an easy task since it requires an identification of the coalitions. Crespi-
Cladera and Renneboog (2003) and Guttierez and Tribo (2004) choose to study possible 
coalitions. Contrary to these studies, I analyse explicit agreements between large shareholders 
and hence examine real coalitions.  
In this paper, I try to disentangle positive and negative effects of shareholder agreements 
through an analysis of valuation. Following the methodology adopted in earlier studies (e.g. 
Morck et al., 1988), I explore the relation between firm valuation and the existence of an 
agreement between its blockholders. The association between firm value and characteristics 
of the agreement (contained clauses, types of its signatories) is also investigated. 
My analysis relies on a sample of 300 French listed companies over the period 2000-2005. 
In France, shareholder agreements must be disclosed to the AMF (the French equivalent to 
SEC) in the five days following their signature as soon as they concern at least 0.5% of the 
securities or voting rights. The study is focused on the interactions and the agreements 
between large shareholders that I define as owning at least 10% of the voting rights. In other 
words shareholder agreements within complex ownership structures are analysed. 
The first result refers to the prevalence of complex ownership structures: 37.60% of 
French listed firms have at least two large shareholders. In 43.75% of complex ownership 
structures, an agreement (whatever its type) is in force between the two major shareholders. 
Most of the agreements contain a “concerted action” provision specifying that contracting 
parties agree to vote together and express a common point of view at the general meeting. 
In line with previous empirical tests, my investigations demonstrate a negative 
relationship between firm valuations and the dispersion of the voting rights across large 
shareholders. However, this negative effect tends to disappear if the large shareholders are 
kept together by an explicit agreement. Shareholder agreements thus appear as countervailing 
mechanisms that offset the negative impact of unevenly distributed stakes. This 
countervailing effect is even more pronounced if the agreement contains a “concerted action” 
provision and/or its signatories are of the same type (e.g. two families or two widely held 
financial institutions). I interpret these results as a validation of the efficient view of 
shareholder agreements.    5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes shareholder agreements and 
institutional framework. Hypotheses related to the relation between shareholder agreements 
and firm valuation are discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the data and provides 
descriptive statistics. In section 5, empirical results and robustness checks are exposed. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Shareholder agreements: clauses and French institutional framework 
 
2.1)  Definition, clauses and the notion of “concerted action” 
 
In many French corporations, shareholders are kept together by an explicit agreement 
(hereafter “shareholder pact” or “shareholder agreement”). According to Boubaker (2005), 
this is a prevalent phenomenon insofar as 170 of 510 French listed firms (i.e. one third) have 
such an agreement. 
I simply define shareholder pacts as agreements between all or part of the shareholders. 
According to Moulin (2002), the purpose of these pacts is to take, retain and organize 
effective control over the firm. As this paper is focused on listed companies, it is worth 
mentioning that these pacts are extra-statutory and only concern a small number of 
shareholders.  
The shareholder pact can contain a large number of clauses. According to Daigre et al. 
(2002), it is possible to distinguish three main categories:  
-  financial provisions are related to the purchase, the sale and the transfer of securities. The 
most widespread financial clause is the pre-emptive buying right. If such a clause exists, a 
contracting shareholder wishing to sell her stake is required to offer it to the other 
contracting shareholders. In other words, the latter have a priority buying right over the 
shares to be sold. 
-  management provisions organize a distribution of powers and a control over the firms’ 
decisions. For instance, a clause can prescribe board composition between large 
shareholders.  
-  miscellaneous provisions mainly concern the “smooth functioning” of the pact. For 
instance, a referee can be ex-ante designated in order to solve possible ex-post problems. 
Termination clauses can also be included: they precisely define ex-ante the situations that 
will lead ex-post to the cancellation of the agreement.    6
Following this classification, appendix A describes the most common clauses of 
shareholder pacts. It should be noted that this typology is far from exhaustive. The 
imagination of lawyers is the only limit to the clauses of shareholder pacts. In my analysis of 
French shareholder agreements, I have indeed come upon nearly 200 different provisions. 
Therefore, appendix A only describes the most widespread ones. 
An important question arises from the signing of an agreement: can it be described as a 
concerted action? According to French law, an “agreement concluded to acquire or sell voting 
rights or to exercise these voting rights so as to implement a common policy towards the 
company” is characteristic of concerted action. The most important feature of a concerted 
action is the fact that contracting shareholders express a common will and vision about the 
firm’s strategic decisions.  
Depending on their clauses, some shareholder pacts will be described as concerted action 
and some others will not. For example, a shareholder pact which only contains pre-emptive 
rights will not necessarily be considered as a concerted action. If the same agreement also 
includes the obligation for the contracting parties to meet before the general meeting in order 
to decide on vote orientation, it will constitute a concerted action. In certain cases no financial 
/ management / miscellaneous provisions are written but nevertheless the parties agree to a 
concerted action and disclose it to the regulator and the investors. I define this situation as 
“Simple Concert” in appendix A. 
Appendix B provides an example of a shareholder pact in order to illustrate the diversity 
of the clauses. This agreement concerns the cosmetics world leader L’OREAL and was 
concluded in 2004. Its contracting parties were L’OREAL’s two major shareholders: the 
Bettencourt Family and the widely held corporation NESTLE who respectively owned 29% 
and 28% of the voting rights. Following my classification, the pact contains: (1) pre-emptive 
rights (PREMUT), (2) clauses that govern the cession and the acquisition of securities insofar 
as contracting parties agree neither to sell nor to buy shares (CAP + FLOOR), (3) provisions 
regarding board representation (BOARD), (4) an improvement of corporate governance 
(GOV, with the creation of a specialized board committee) and lastly (5) a concerted action 
(CONCERT).  
 
2.2)  Legal obligations and sanctions  
 
Each shareholder pact must be disclosed to the AMF (the French stock exchange 
regulator) in the five days following its signature as soon as it concerns at least 0.5% of the   7
securities or voting rights. This rule allows to know precisely the contracting shareholders, 
their stakes and above all the agreement’s provisions. Since the adoption of a new regulation 
in 2001, the non-disclosure of the agreement is strictly sanctioned in period of takeover: 
clauses that are likely to influence the offer price will be considered as null and void. 
Concerted action implies specific obligations. French law contains notification procedures 
that apply to shareholders crossing 1/20, 1/10, 1/5, 1/3, 1/2 and 2/3 of the cash flow or voting 
rights. When shareholder X and shareholder Y are bound by a concerted action, they must 
jointly disclose their stake. For example, if X owns 25% of the shares and Y rises its stake 
from 7% to 12%, then (1) Y must disclose the crossing of the 1/10 threshold and 
simultaneously (2) X and Y must disclose the crossing of the 1/3 threshold. This obligation is 
far from insignificant in the French context where the crossing of the 1/3 threshold entails a 
mandatory bid for the acquisition of all existing securities.  
These legal disclosure requirements govern the relationships between contracting parties 
and other investors. It is important to mention the obligations that bind the contracting 
shareholders. According to French civil law, shareholders pacts are ordinary private contracts 
(Daigre et al., 2002). Consequently, the failure to comply with the clauses of the agreement 
might only lead to damage payments.
2  
Due to this specific legal framework, shareholder agreements are difficult to enforce 
according to Bloch and Hege (2001). Since the only threat is damage payments, there are too 
many incentives for a contracting shareholder to free-ride and deviate from the ex-ante 
defined obligations.  
 
3.  Literature and hypotheses 
 
Sharing of control is a question recently addressed by several theoretical papers. Zwiebel 
(1995) analyses situations from which a complex ownership structure could emerge. Dhillon 
and Rossetto (2006) argue that the presence of a second large shareholder can shift the voting 
outcome of the general meeting toward riskier investment projects that minority shareholders 
prefer. In Bolton and Von Thadden’s (1998) liquidity-control trade-off, the presence of a 
second large blockholder can be detrimental to firm value if she absorbs liquidity without 
providing any offsetting monitoring effort. In many of these papers (e.g. Pagano and Roëll, 
                                                 
2 Consider the following case: shareholder X, who has granted shareholder Y a pre-emptive right, sells her shares 
to a third person T without giving priority buying right to Y. In such a case, the injured party Y can go to court 
but can only expect damage payments from X. The cancellation of the transaction is indeed out of the question.   8
1998), the second large shareholder is analysed as a potential monitor of the first one. In case 
of shareholder agreements, the former appears a possible ally of the latter. The impact of 
shareholders’ alliances on firm value is an empirical challenge. In order to address this issue, I 
build my analysis on previous literature that connects firm value and ownership structure 
(especially the difference in stakes between the shareholders). 
 
3.1)  Firm value and difference in sizes of the largest owners 
 
In Bloch and Hege’s (2001) model, two large shareholders compete for the control over a 
firm. As neither of them has enough power, these blockholders must attract the votes of 
minority shareholders. At the shareholders’ meeting, each of them proposes a strategic plan 
that contains a binding commitment concerning private benefits consumption. Bloch and 
Hege (2001) demonstrate that private benefits rise with the difference between the cash flow 
rights of the two large shareholders. In situations of low control contestability (i.e. in cases 
where the first shareholder holds cash flow rights that significantly excess those of the second 
shareholder), minority shareholders should anticipate expropriation. They consequently agree 
to buy the shares only if those shares are sold at a discount (La Porta et al., 2000). Hence, 
following this model, we assume that firm value should decrease as the size difference 
between major shareholders increases. Lehman and Weigand (2000), Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) and Laeven and Levine (2007) validate this assumption by using different measures of 
ownership concentration and contestability (Herfindahl index, Shapley value, wedge between 
cash-flow rights of the first and the second shareholder).  
 
3.2)  Shareholder agreements and difference in sizes of the largest owners 
 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) analyse the impact of cash-flow and voting rights that 
are unevenly distributed among shareholders of a closely held firm. In such situations, 
shareholders find it easy to form coalitions (“coalition formation effect”) and seize control 
over the firm while their financial participations are minimal. In this context, shareholders of 
the coalition are less prone to internalize the costs of their actions and more attracted by the 
consumption of private benefits. The following example illustrates this point: suppose there 
are only three shareholders and compare two possible ownership structures. The first structure 
is {1/3, 1/3, 1/3} and the second {45%, 35%, 20%}. In both situations, two shareholders can 
share control (because they own more than 50% of voting rights). In the first case this 
“winning coalition” pools 2/3 of the voting rights while in the second case a winning coalition   9
could emerge with only 55%. This last situation would be potentially more detrimental to 
minority shareholders, because the more shares it owns the more a coalition is willing to 
maximise firm value (“alignment effect”).  
The existence of a shareholder pact clearly characterizes the existence of a coalition 
between contracting parties. If a shareholder agreement is in force between two shareholders 
whose stakes are very disparate in size, the situation is such that the coalition formation effect 
is maximal. For instance a large shareholder could have signed the agreement with a small 
shareholder in order to secure an effective control over the firm with the smallest possible 
cash flow stake. The agreement then appears as an expropriation tool. This argument leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: A shareholder agreement intensifies the negative impact on firm value of a large 
difference in sizes of the major shareholders. 
 
Some empirical findings tend to validate this hypothesis. Guttierez and Tribo (2004) study 
possible coalitions among shareholders of Spanish corporations and conclude that firm 
performances are better when the stakes of the participating members are of similar size. It 
should be noted that this paper relies on possible coalitions, whereas in my study I am able to 
identify real coalitions thanks to actual shareholder agreements. Moreover, using an event-
study methodology, Gianfrate (2007) notices a negative and significant abnormal return when 
an agreement is signed and disclosed to the market while the announcement of an agreement 
termination is associated with positive and significant abnormal return. These results tend to 
validate the idea that shareholder agreements are expropriation devices.  
On the contrary, some authors suggest that shareholder agreements have a positive impact. 
Chemla et al. (2007) theoretically
3 show that these agreements can induce the parties to make 
ex-ante investments and prevent ex-post transfers (the so-called “hold up problem”). They 
also precisely describe and analyse the qualities of a large number of clauses in terms of 
protection of shares value. In another theoretical model, Gomes and Novaes (2005) assume 
bargaining between the members of a coalition that sometimes leads the firm to give up 
investment projects that are detrimental for minority shareholders. This should have a positive 
effect on firm valuation. 
                                                 
3 To my knowledge, this paper is the only one to provide such theoretical analysis.   10
The extensive use of shareholder agreements by venture capitalists (see Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003) may be considered as a straightforward proof of their validity. As venture 
capitalists’ behaviour is often viewed as guided by value maximisation, shareholder pacts 
may be thought as value-enhancing tools.
4  
The link between firm valuation and shareholder agreements has been addressed in 
previous literature. Based on a sample of 299 French companies conducting an IPO over the 
period 1993-1999, Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) document a higher valuation for firms 
that have a shareholder agreement. In Boubaker’s (2005) study, the coefficient of a dummy 
variable “voting pact or in concert action” is positive and sometimes significant, what 
invalidates his hypothesis of expropriating collusion. Finally, Villalonga and Amit (2007) 
conclude that voting agreements
5 can not be analysed as means of extracting private benefits. 
Firm value is indeed enhanced when such mechanisms are used.  
Volpin (2002) documents a higher sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor performance when 
the shareholders of the firm are kept together by an explicit agreement. As a conclusion, such 
agreements can be seen as efficient governance mechanisms. This is also the point of view 
adopted by Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) who analyse the dividend payout policy of Italian 
firms. They observe a higher payout in firms whose shareholders have signed an agreement, 
what is interpreted as a conclusive proof of a less severe agency conflict between large and 
minority shareholders. 
To sum up, the literature provides mixed evidence: on one hand shareholder agreements 
appear as expropriation tools, on the other hand as efficient coordination mechanisms. I try to 
disentangle these two opposing effects in my empirical analysis.  
 
3.3)  Characteristics of shareholder pacts 
 
Concerted action is the main characteristic of some shareholder pacts. By acting in 
concert, contracting shareholders agree to express a common view about firm’s strategic 
decisions. It is a strong commitment that involves (for instance) the same voting strategy at 
the general meeting or the adoption of a common position in the case of a hostile takeover. I 
then expect a stronger effect when the shareholder agreement contains a concerted action. If 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that Kaplan and Stömberg (2003) and Chemla et al. (2007) study shareholder agreements 
within privately-held companies. They describe clauses (e.g. drag along rights) that are not used in listed firms. 
5 Under this type of agreement, a shareholder transfers her voting rights to another shareholder. In my sample, I 
never come upon such transfer of power. Nevertheless, it is a special means of sharing control.   11
the purpose of shareholder agreements is an expropriation of minority shareholders, this 
expropriation should be greater if a concerted action is in force. I then hypothesize: 
  
H2: The effect of shareholder agreements on firm valuation is more pronounced when a 
concerted action is in force. 
 
The type of contracting shareholders is another interesting issue. To my knowledge, there 
is no theory making the connection between shareholders’ types and shareholder pacts. 
Nevertheless, one could suggest the following intuition which consists in analysing the types
6 
of blockholders as a coordination mechanism. It is indeed maybe easier for two families to 
coordinate their actions than it is for a family and a widely held corporation. Furthermore, 
shareholders of the same type typically have the same fiscal concerns. Consider an ownership 
structure with two large blockholders of the same type (e.g. two families): the existence of an 
agreement between them appears as a “second seatbelt”. As they were of the same types, the 
two shareholders maybe were on the same wavelength concerning firm’s strategic decisions. 
Nevertheless, by signing an agreement, they explicitly make sure of future cooperation. This 
leads us to the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: The impact of shareholder agreements on firm valuation is more pronounced when 
the contracting parties are of the same type.  
 
Taking into account the types of the shareholders is also an important control process. If 
contracting shareholders always were of the same types, then the “agreement effect” could in 
fact be a “type effect”. Laeven and Levine (2007) evaluate the impact of differences in sizes 
and in types between large shareholders and demonstrate that a large wedge between 
shareholders’ stakes negatively impacts firm value, this effect being more pronounced when 
the two shareholders are of the same type. This result validates the existence of a type effect. 
It should be noted that the tests of Maury and Pajuste (2005) support another view (same sype 






                                                 
6 “Type” refers to the identity of the shareholder: Family, widely held corporation, widely held financial firm, 
state…   12
4.  Data, methodology, and descriptive statistics 
 
4.1)  Database construction 
 
For my investigations, I use the SBF 250 firms. The SBF 250 index weights on average 
(median) 86% (89%) of the whole French market capitalisation over the period 2000-2005. 
Over the period 2001 to 2005, I selected all the companies that were quoted as 
components of the SBF 250 index as of December 31 of those years. I excluded financial 
corporations (SIC code 6000 - 6999) due to the difficulty of calculating profitability and 
valuation data. Because of numerous changes in the composition of the index, the sample 
contains 301 non financial firms.  
For each firm, I collected ownership data over 6 years (2000 to 2005). This database is 
collected manually from firms’ annual reports.
7 Although this manual collection is a slow 
process, it is necessary to the extent that the commercial databases do not provide accurate 
information.
8 For instance, the ownership component of Thomson One Banker only supplies 
percentages of capital which can strongly differ from percentages of voting rights. In France, 
the charter of the firm can indeed authorize double voting rights for registered shares that 
have been held for a defined number of years (between 2 and 4 years).
9 For example, the main 
shareholder of LVMH is a holding company which holds only 42.4% of cash flow rights but 
60.2% of voting rights. According to Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), 68% of the French listed 
firms authorize double voting rights. Consequently, this special mechanism deserves strong 
attention.  
I also manually collected data about shareholder agreements. These are easily accessible 
through a dedicated section in the annual report but also through designated pages on the 
AMF website. These filings always contain the signature date, the identity of contracting 
shareholders and the content of the agreement. 
Accounting and financial data were collected from Datastream and Worldscope. I 
eliminate all firms for which required ownership and accounting data are missing. Hence, my 
sample covers 300 firms and contains a total of 1592 observations. Due to new listings, 
mergers and delisting, the panel is an unbalanced one. 
                                                 
7 These filings are downloadable from the AMF (the French equivalent to SEC) website (www.amf-france.org) 
8 Here, this lack of accuracy does not stem from mistakes in the commercial databases (as mentioned by Dlugosz 
et al., 2006) but from the fact that French specificities of governance and ownership are not well taken into 
account. 
9 About this mechanism, see also Bloch and Kremp (2001) and Ginglinger and Saddour (2006).   13
4.2)  Methodology 
 
The literature about ultimate ownership, which starts with Laporta et al. (1999), describes 
precisely the means of enhancing control. Pyramids, dual-class shares, cross-holdings and 
double voting rights (in the French institutional setting) allow a shareholder to own control 
rights that strongly exceed cash flow rights. In accordance with this literature, cash flow rights 
are calculated as the product of ownership stakes along a control chain whereas voting rights 
are measured as the weakest link (i.e. the minimal voting stake) in this control chain.  
The purpose of this study is to analyse the relationships and the interactions between large 
shareholders. I define a large shareholder as an individual or an entity owning at least 10% of 
the voting rights of the company. For each large shareholder, I then use the ultimate owner 
methodology at the 20% and 10% thresholds. For instance, consider a company (firm X) 
whose main shareholder is the firm Y with 18% of cash flow and voting rights. If the main 
shareholder of Y is the family F with 15% of cash flow and voting rights, I will say that: 
-  at the 10% threshold, the ultimate owner of firm X is the family F with 2.7% 
(=18%*15%) of cash flow rights and 15% (=min{18%, 15%}) of voting rights. 
-  at the 20% threshold, the ultimate owner of firm X is the widely held firm Y with 18% of 
cash flow and voting rights. 
It is worth mentioning that my methodology slightly differs from those adopted by Faccio and 
Lang (2002). With this latter methodology we would say that at the 20% threshold firm X has 
no controlling owner. Nevertheless, at the 10% threshold, the two methodologies lead to the 
same results.  
In accordance with La Porta et al. (1999), the ultimate owners are classified into five 
categories: (1) an individual or a family (I add the stakes of shareholders who carry the same 
family name), (2) the State, (3) a widely held financial institution such as bank or insurance 
company, (4) a widely held corporation, or (5) miscellaneous such as non-profit organisation, 
employees… 
 
4.3)  Variables 
 
Following earlier studies (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Claessens et al., 2002), I use Tobin’s Q, 
proxied by the market to book ratio, as a measure of firm valuation. I compute this measure as 
the ratio (Total Assets – Book Value of common equity + Market Capitalisation) / Total   14
Assets. To reduce the impact of extreme values, I censor the Tobin’s Q at the 99
th percentile. 
The statistical analysis is hence conducted on a sample of 1576 (=1592*0.99) firm-years. 
Ownership variables are the following. CFR1 denotes the cash flow rights of the first 
shareholder. This measure is computed at the 20% and 10% thresholds using the ultimate 
owner methodology. The role of the largest blockholder is ambiguous. On one hand, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) argue that a large shareholder can remedy the free-rider problem 
emphasized by Grossman and Hart (1980), but on the other hand she might generate a value-
destroying overmonitoring (Burkart et al., 1997). Consequently, the sense of the relationship 
between firm value and first shareholder’s stake is not really clear (Holderness, 2003).  
I also calculate the ultimate voting rights of each shareholder holding at least 10% of 
firms’ voting rights. This calculation is made at the 20% and 10% threshold. Let VRi be the 
ultimate percentage of the voting rights of the large shareholder i. The whole sample contains 
2168 values for VRi as I come upon 2168 shareholders whose direct percentage of voting 
rights is greater than 10%. For widely held companies (i.e. firms without any large 
shareholder), I set VR1 = VR2 = … = 0. 
In order to evaluate the dispersion of powers between the largest blockholders, I compute 
the measure VR1-VR2.
10 Following Laeven and Levine (2007), VR1-VR2=0 when the firm 
does not have two shareholders with at least 10% of voting rights. I also create a dummy 
variable (LOW CONTES) which takes the value of one when VR1-VR2 is greater than its 
median value
11 and zero otherwise. A negative impact of these variables on firm valuation 
would be in line with previous studies (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Maury and Pajuste, 2005) 
which tend to demonstrate the validity of theoretical model (e.g. Bloch and Hege, 2001). 
Previous related literature addresses the question of a large discrepancy between cash flow 
rights and voting rights of the first shareholder. According to Bebchuk et al. (2000), the 
separation of ownership and control can lead to severe agency conflicts between minority 
shareholders and the controlling owner. A measure of the wedge between voting rights and 
cash flow rights of the first shareholder (VR1-CFR1) is thus included. Following theoretical 
and empirical literature (Claessens et al., 2002), I expect a negative relationship between this 
measure and Tobin’s Q. 
To test the hypotheses concerning shareholder agreements, I use dummy variables. 
AGREEMENT (CONCERT) takes a value of one if there are two large shareholders who are 
                                                 
10 I exclusively focus on the stakes of the two largest shareholders insofar as most of ownership structures with at 
least 2 large shareholders (i.e. complex ownership structures) seldom involve more than 2 large owners. 
11 I take the median value for the sample of complex ownership structures (n=592, median=14.03%).   15
kept together by a shareholder pact (concerted action). In order to test for any type effect, I 
include a dummy variable that indicates whether the two large shareholders are of the same 
type (SAME TYPE). 
Following previous studies, variables that can influence the valuation of the firm are 
included. These control variables are the size of the company (SIZE, proxied by the logarithm 
of the book value of the assets), its growth rate (GROWTH calculated for the year t as Net 
Salest / Net salest-1 – 1), its financial leverage (LEVERAGE, ratio Total Debts / Assets) and 
the tangibility of the assets (TANGIBILITY defined as the ratio of Tangible Assets on Total 
Assets). Dummy variables are also included in order to take into account sector effect (7 
sectors corresponding to 7 primary SIC codes as I exclude financial companies with SIC code 
6) and time effect (a dummy variable for each year of observation). 
All variables used in this study are described in appendix C. 
 
4.4)  Descriptive statistics 
   
Dependent and control variables 
 
In table 1 (panel A), the observations are classified by year and by industry. Not 
surprisingly, Tobin’s Q was at its highest level in 2000. The distribution of the observations 
appears homogenous over the 6 years of the study.  
The panel B provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. On 
average (median), Tobin’s Q is equal to 1.648 (1.335). In the whole sample (including widely 
held firms with CFR1=VR1=0), the main shareholder owns 34.7% of cash flow rights and 
44.3% of voting rights. Due to pyramids and double voting rights
12, there is a wedge between 
voting and cash-flow rights of nearly 9.5%.  
 
[ Insert table 1 here ] 
 
Strikingly, the minimum value for (VR1-CFR1) is negative. This is due to the mechanism 
of double voting rights. A new shareholder who enters the company does not have this double 
voting right. If other shareholders are long-term ones, they have earned this special voting 
                                                 
12 I observe the presence of double voting rights in 71% of the total sample.    16
right. In such situations, the number of voting rights is therefore greater than the number of 
shares and a new shareholder will own fewer voting rights than cash flow rights.  
 
Ownership structures and prevalence of shareholder agreements 
 
Table 2 provides insights into the ownership structures and the distribution of power 
among large shareholders. First of all and consistent with numerous previous studies (Bloch 
and Kremp, 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002), France appears as a concentrated ownership 
country. Only 9.4% of the observations are widely held firms (i.e. firms without any large 
shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights). Secondly, I notice a complex 
ownership structure (with at least two large blockholders) in 37.6% of the sample. Excluding 
widely held firms, the probability that the first shareholder is alone is 58.5%.
13 That is to say 
that a second large shareholder is a possible monitor of the main shareholder in 41.5% of the 
firm-years. Complex ownership structures are mainly structures with two large blockholders 
(in 77% of the cases). The “most complex” ownership structure exhibits 5 large shareholders 
but is a rare phenomenon (only one firm-year). 
 
[ Insert table 2 here ] 
 
Firms with only one large shareholder are on average fully controlled: there is a majority 
shareholder with 47.3% of cash flow rights but 56.4% of voting rights. The opposite situation 
is that of complex ownership structures, where the first shareholder does not hold controlling 
power and has to bargain with other large shareholder(s). On average, the voting rights of the 
second shareholder are two times smaller than those of the first shareholder (19.4% against 
38.1%).  
Shareholder agreements appear as a prevalent mechanism. In complex ownership 
structures, the two largest shareholders are kept together by an explicit agreement (whatever 
its type and its clauses) in 43.8% of the cases. When an agreement exists, it mainly expresses 
the will of acting together (there is a concerted action in 88% of the cases). In 32 firm-years 
(i.e. 2% of the whole sample), the major shareholders are kept together by an explicit 
agreement but not a concerted action. FI.AGREEMENT refers to this simple agreement that 
only contains financial provisions. 
                                                 
13 This statistic is comparable to those of Faccio and Lang (2002): in their study, the first shareholder is alone in 
64.75% of the French firms with concentrated ownership.   17
Clauses of the shareholder agreements 
 
In this study, the focus is on large shareholders. I thus describe the agreements whose 
signatories are large (owning at least 10% of the voting rights). It should be noted that this 
methodological choice excludes certain agreements, for instance contracts between two small 
shareholders.  
First of all, most of the agreements are in force over several years. For instance, the 
agreement described in the appendix B is the same in 2004 and 2005. It is worth mentioning 
that some agreements contain a duration clause whereas others do not. Certain shareholder 
pacts are described as being “in force as long as the signatories agree to its terms”. In my 
database, I observe an agreement for 259 firm-years. These 259 observations in fact 
correspond to 93 different agreements. If the agreement changes over the period 2000-2005 
due to new contracting shareholders and/or new provisions, I take it into account. For 
instance, over the period 2000-2005, the French listed firm COMPAGNIE DES ALPES 
always had the same major shareholder (the French state) but the second largest shareholder 
changed 3 times. At each change, a new pact was signed. For this peculiar firm, 
AGREEMENT=1 over the 6 years and 3 different filings are analysed. From 93 original 
agreements, 26 replace or render more precise an existing agreement. Within the whole 
sample of 300 firms, 67 (i.e. 22%) had during at least one year two large shareholders who 
were signatories to an agreement. In table 3, a description of the clauses contained in these 93 
agreements is provided. 
 
[ Insert table 3 here ] 
 
The first conclusion is about prevalence of each type of provision: a financial provision is 
in force in 78% of the agreements. Two thirds of the agreement specifies pre-emptive buying 
rights (mutual or unilateral). The number of financial clauses, which could be a proxy for 
sophistication of the agreement, is 2 on median. If we split the agreements between those that 
include a concerted action (81) and those that do not (FI.AGREEMENT, 12), we observe a 
larger prevalence of the financial clauses in the latter sample. Management provisions are as 
widespread as financial provisions to the extent that 81% of the agreements specify a 
management provision. Strikingly, it should be noted that shareholder agreements can contain 
a board representation clause (BOARD) even if the signatories are not parties to a concerted 
action. In fact, this situation arises when a new shareholder enters into the firm, for instance   18
through private placement, but do not want to influence the running of the company. This was 
the case in 1999 for the firm HIGH CO in which the company WPP entered through private 
placement. An agreement specifies that the major shareholder will vote in favour of the 
nomination of WPP at the board of directors, however WPP does not act in concert with the 
main shareholder. The objective of the clause is to allow WPP the possibility to have correct 
information about firm’s strategic decisions. 
It is worth noting that only 11% of the studied agreements contain the CONTROL 
provision. It tends to prove that contracting parties are not especially concerned by a possible 
free-riding of other signatories. Signatories seem to trust each other and do not need any 
mechanism that would ensure adherence to the signed obligations. Contrary to Bloch and 
Hege’s (2001) predictions, the threat of free-riding does not appear to be an important concern 
for contracting shareholders. In panel B of table 3, the “complexity” of shareholder 
agreements is analysed by studying the combination of the clauses. 38% of the agreements are 
very complex in that they include financial, management and miscellaneous provisions. 79% 
of the agreements specify at least a financial provision. 
In table 4, I try to link ownership structure and shareholder agreements. Within the sample 
of 592 complex ownership structures (with at least two large blockholders), I distinguish 
between firms that are concerned by an agreement (259) and firms that are not (333). The 
percentage of the voting rights held by the major shareholders are described, as well as their 
joint stakes and the dispersion of their voting stakes. The emerging fact is that the second 
shareholder holds significantly more rights in instances where she is signatory to an 
agreement. Nevertheless, the dispersion of the voting stakes does not significantly differ. This 
descriptive statistic leads us to the conclusion that shareholder agreements do not specially 
bind shareholders owning very different stakes. If the major shareholder of the company was 
guided by an expropriation of minority shareholders, she maybe would choose a contracting 
shareholder that will allow her to seize control over the firm (with a joint stake very close to 
50%). However, I notice that the shareholders bound by an agreement control 61.0% of the 
voting rights whereas those that are not own 54.8%. For a coalition, an expropriation of 
minority shareholders is more interesting if it owns 54.8% of the voting rights and 45% of the 
cash flow rights than if these percentages are respectively 61.0% and 49.1%. This simple 
statistic tends to invalidate the intuition that shareholder pacts act as expropriation 
mechanisms.  
 
[ Insert table 4 here ]   19
Large shareholders’ types 
 
In panel A of table 5, the types of large shareholders are described. I am only interested 
here in ownership structures with at least two large shareholders, that is why the sample only 
contains 592 observations. 
 
[ Insert table 5 here ] 
  
The first shareholder is a family in 63.5% of the observations.
14 In 46.1% of complex 
ownership structures, the two blockholders are of the same type. When the first shareholder is 
a family, the probability that the second shareholder is also a family is 64.1%. The other types 
of large owners (State, Widely Held Company, Widely Held Financial Firm, Miscellaneous) 
seldom share power with a blockholder of the same type. 
In order to address the link between signatories’ types and clauses of the agreements, the 
whole sample is sub-divided into two groups: (1) a sample of firms whose largest 
shareholders are of the same type (273 firm-years) and (2) a sample of firms whose largest 
shareholders are not (319 firm-years). In panel B of table 5, the prevalence of each clause 
(from my typology) is described using dummy variables. For instance, PREMU takes a value 
of one if, during a particular year, the studied firm has at least two large shareholders who 
grant each other a pre-emptive buying right. From this panel, it can be noted that shareholders 
of the same type are more prone to enter into a concerted action. On the contrary, simple 
financial agreements more easily emerge when the two large shareholders are of different 
types. Concerning the clauses, I observe a larger prevalence of financial and management 
provisions when the two shareholders are of the same type. This conclusion also holds for the 
most widespread clause (mutual pre-emptive buying right, PREMUT). Pre-emptive buying 
rights appear as a means of securing a stable control over the firm: by exercising her pre-
emptive right, a contracting shareholder prevents the arrival of a new shareholder. This 
provision may be considered as a protection clause. The sub-sample “same type shareholders” 
mainly contains families, and maybe families are more prone to consider the arrival of a new 
shareholder as a threat and want to prevent it. Another interesting feature is the fact that 
shareholders of the same type use more “complete contract” containing situations (CASES) in 
which coordination is required.   
                                                 
14 The first shareholder is a family in 76.6% of the firms with only one large shareholder (unreported statistic).   20
5.  Multivariate analysis 
 
In this section, the empirical evaluation of the relationship between firm value and 
shareholder agreements is presented. The main model is an ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
sector and year dummies; regressions are run on a sample of 1576 firm-years. As the sample 
includes a temporal aspect (historical data for 6 years), it allows for panel specifications. I 
discuss these specifications in the next section dedicated to robustness checks. Here, the 
following model is estimated:  
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where: 
-  Qi,t denotes Tobin’s Q for firm i at the end of year t 
-  the four “CONTROL” variables are firms’ size, leverage, growth and tangibility of the 
assets 
-  YEAR and INDUSTRY are dummy variables 
-  OWNERSHIP variables refer to the characteristics of the ownership structure: stake of the 
first shareholder, difference in sizes between the two largest shareholders… 
 
5.1)  Low contestability, shareholder agreements and firm valuation 
 
First of all, the impact on firm valuation of a large dispersion of voting rights across 
shareholders is evaluated. In regressions (1) and (2) of table 6, I use continuous (VR1-VR2) 
and dummy (LOW CONTES) measures. This leads us to the following result: Tobin’s Q (a 
proxy for firm valuation) is negatively related to the difference in stakes between large 
shareholders. Furthermore, Tobin’s Q is lower in case of a low contestability (i.e. when VR1-
VR2 is greater than its median value). These regressions highlight the negative impact of a 
low contestability of first shareholder’s power and hence validate Bloch and Hege’s (2001) 
model. This result is in line with previous empirical studies. It should be noted that the 
economic impact is significant: a one standard-deviation increase in the difference in stakes 
(VR1-VR2) induces a 0.775 decrease of Tobin’s, or a decrease of 6% of its median value.  
In regression (1) the cash-flow rights and the wedge between voting and cash flow rights 
of the first shareholder are also included. Consistent with previous studies (Claessens et al., 
2002), the coefficient of the variable (VR1-CFR1) is significantly negative. This is in line 
with the model of Bebchuk et al. (2000): the use of pyramids and double voting rights appear   21
as an entrenchment device. Concerning the coefficient of the variable CFR1, it should be 
noted that it becomes insignificant (1) on the sample of concentrated ownership (n=1428) or 
(2) if the regression includes a dummy variable that takes a value of one if there is no large 
shareholder.
15 In regression (1), the negative and significant coefficient may thus be due to the 
fact that widely held firms are included. Be that as it may, my results tend to validate the idea 
that the sense of the relationship between firm value and the cash flow rights of the main 
shareholder is not clear (Holderness, 2003). The regression (1) also leads to the following 
conclusion: for outside investors, a high discrepancy between voting rights of the major 
shareholders is of similar importance to a high discrepancy between voting and cash flow 
rights of the first shareholder (as demonstrated by very close coefficients).  
 
[ Insert table 6 here ] 
 
I now turn to the analysis of shareholder agreements’ impact. I interact my measures of 
control contestability with a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the major 
shareholders are kept together by an explicit agreement (and 0 otherwise). The results are 
presented in regressions (3) to (5) in table 6. 
Tobin’s Q decreases as the contestability decreases (i.e. VR1-VR2 increases) but this 
effect tends to disappear when the major shareholders are contracting parties of a shareholder 
pact (regression (3)). In other words, the negative impact of a high wedge between the voting 
stakes of the major shareholders seems to be exclusively driven by those observations that are 
not concerned by an agreement (regression (4)). This conclusion holds when using the 
dummy measure (regression (5)). As further checks, in regressions (6) and (7), I run the 
regressions on the “complex ownership” sample (592 observations) and sub-divide it into two 
groups: firms that are concerned by a shareholder agreement and firms that are not. The 
negative impact of low contestability only appears in second sample. This analysis tends to 
invalidate hypothesis H1. Rather than expropriation devices, shareholder agreements appear 
as coordination mechanisms. Even in situations of high wedges between large shareholders’ 
power, shareholder agreements seem to ensure a cooperation that is not detrimental to firm 
value. Since the first hypothesis is not validated, it is necessary to think about the non 
negative effect of shareholder agreements. One could interpret them as means of binding the 
first shareholder to take into account other (contracting) shareholders’ expectations. In a case 
                                                 
15 For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported here but are available upon request.    22
of low contestability of her power, the first shareholder may be prone to expropriate minority 
shareholders (even large shareholders with at least 10% of the voting rights). Nevertheless, 
when a shareholder agreement is in force, the first shareholder tends to internalize the costs of 
her bad decisions. As analysed by Gomes and Novaes (2005), decisions are taken in light of 
the coalition’s stake. These regressions may be a validation for an alignment effect but not for 
a coalition formation effect (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000).  
 
5.2)  Concerted action and blockholders’ types 
 
The purpose of shareholder agreements might depend on the provisions they contain. 
When a concerted action provision is in force, large shareholders pledge to express a common 
view about firm’s important decisions. This commitment is very strong; I therefore expect 
that its effect on firm value is more pronounced than that of a simple financial commitment. 
Hypothesis H2 relies on this intuition. From previous regressions we deduce that shareholder 
pacts do not lead to lower valuation and thus can not be considered as expropriation 
mechanisms. This should particularly be true when the agreement contains a concerted action 
provision. 
In order to test for this intuition, I distinguish between agreements that are constitutive of 
concerted action (CONCERT) and those that are not (FI.AGREEMENT). The large majority 
of the shareholder pacts matches the first category. In regression (1) of table 7, I interact these 
dummy variables with my measure of dispersion of voting stakes. This test tends to validate 
the hypothesis H2: whereas a simple financial agreement does not significantly countervail 
the negative impact of a low contestability of the first shareholder’s power, concerted action 
does. Concerted action seems to preclude the largest shareholder from an expropriation of 
other shareholders.  
 
[ Insert table 7 here ] 
 
Another important feature of shareholder agreements is the identity of its signatories. We 
assume a possible more pronounced effect of the shareholder agreement if the contracting 
parties are of the same types (e.g. two families or two banks). Following Laeven and Levine 
(2007), I start with a test of a possible type effect (regression (2)). Like shareholder pacts, 
common types seem to compensate for the negative effect of a large dispersion of the voting 
stakes. This is in line with Laeven and Levine’s (2007) study. One could argue that a   23
shareholder agreement is a substitute for the natural coordination device provided by common 
types. In regression (3), I try to disentangle the possible “type” and “agreement” effects by 
creating three interaction variables. From this analysis, I conclude that shareholder 
agreements and common types are both means of countervailing the negative effect of a large 
dispersion of the stakes between the two major shareholders. When two large shareholders are 
kept together by a concerted action and are of the same types, the negative effect of a large 
dispersion fully disappears. This is a validation for the hypothesis H3. 
At this point, my analysis of the shareholder agreements can be summarized as follows:  
-  (1)  rather than expropriation devices, these agreements appear as coordination 
mechanisms that mitigate the agency conflict arising from a large dispersion of the 
powers. Hypothesis H1 is rejected. 
-  (2) the positive effect of shareholder pacts is greater when the contracting shareholder are 
kept together by a concerted action. This validates the hypothesis H2. 
-  (3) the positive effect of shareholder pacts is more pronounced in situations where the 
signatories are of the same type. This validates the hypothesis H3. 
 
5.3)  Concerted action and other clauses 
 
It could also be worth analysing the impact of each type of clause. One of the difficulties 
is that agreements typically contain numerous clauses; it is consequently difficult to 
disentangle the effect of each clause. In line with my previous results, I assume that concerted 
action has a strong explanatory power. Consequently, I try to evaluate the impact of a peculiar 
clause by interacting it with the concerted action provision. This is done in regressions (4) to 
(6) of table  7. In regression (4), a dummy variable that indicates whether the agreement 
contains a financial clause (whatever its type) is included. In regression (5), the impact of pre-
emptive right is evaluated. Regression (6) investigates the effect of a special management 
provision regarding board representation (BOARD). 
These regressions lead to the conclusion that a concerted action is a good coordination 
mechanism in cases where it is combined with a financial clause. This is in line with the 
theoretical model of Chemla et al. (2007) which focuses on the positive effects of financial 
clauses. This is especially true for pre-emption rights (regression (5)). I repeat such analysis 
for the other financial clauses and notice similar results for clauses specifying a threshold 
under which the percentage of voting or cash flow rights must not pass (FLOOR). On the 
contrary, an agreement containing a concerted action provision and another financial clause   24
(CAP or JOINT or DILU) does not appear to be a value-enhancing mechanism.
16 From 
regression (6), I conclude that a simple concerted action provision is better than a 
combination of a concerted action and a clause regarding board composition.  
These results are not necessarily easy to interpret. The allocation of board seats between 
contracting shareholders can be viewed as a means of securing control over the firm. If it 
allows the controlling coalition to own a percentage of seats that is greater than its percentage 
of cash flow rights then this coalition will be more interested in extracting private benefits. 
The result is in line with that of Villalonga and Amit (2007) who demonstrate a negative 
relationship between firm value and disproportional board representation. 
 
5.4)  Robustness checks 
 
In this section, I address 4 issues of robustness. Firstly, the question of control thresholds 
arises. In previous regressions, CFR1, VR1, VR2 are calculated at the 20% threshold. I re-run 
my regressions using data computed at the 10% threshold. At the 10% threshold, my 
methodology completely fits (see above) that adopted by Faccio and Lang (2002). My results 
will thus be directly comparable to those of Laeven and Levine (2007). In regression (1) of 
table 8,  I do not point out any results opposing those observed in tables 6 and 7. The 
shareholder agreement tends to mitigate the agency conflict that could arise from a high 
dispersion of the stakes. 
Secondly, contestability metric could be differently computed, for instance as a ratio 
rather than a difference. In regression (2), dispersion is calculated as the ratio VR1/VR2 (this 
ratio is set equal to 0 when the firm does not have at least two large shareholders). As an 
additional check, I include in regression (2) two dummy variables : WIDELY HELD is set 
equal to 1 if the firm does not have any shareholder with at least 10% of the voting rights; 
MAJORITY takes a value of one if the first shareholder holds at least 50% of the voting 
rights. These variables are included in order to control for the specificities of these two types 
of extreme ownership structures (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Using these specifications, the 
main conclusions hold.  
Thirdly, another measure of shareholder power could be used. In my previous empirical 
analysis I rely on voting rights percentages. The Shapley value provides another interesting 
metric of the power of each shareholder as it reflects her ability to influence the result of a 
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voting game. It measures the extent to which this shareholder is pivotal to the voted 
decision.
17 SVi denotes the Shapley value for shareholder i; it is equal to 0 in cases where 
there are no large shareholders. For listed companies, the computation of this index is a 
complex task because the stakes of many shareholders (forming the free float) are not known. 
As this study is especially focused on the power of large blockholders, it will be assumed that 
all the shareholders who do not own at least 10% of voting rights do not have any power in 
the voting game. The Shapley value is calculated as its continuous version for oceanic games 
(Milnor and Shapley, 1978). In order to evaluate the dispersion of powers between the two 
largest blockholders, the measure SV1-SV2 is computed. From regression (3), I also conclude 
that the negative effect of a large dispersion of voting rights across large shareholders is fully 
compensated by a “shareholder agreement effect”.  
 
[ Insert table 8 here ] 
 
Lastly, another econometrical analysis using panel specifications is conducted. As it 
contains historical data over 6 years, my database allows for such econometrical analysis. In 
regression (4) to (7), panel data fixed effect specifications are performed. It should be noted 
that the Hausman test leads us to prefer fixed effects rather than random effects. Similarly, 
Tobin’s Q decreases as the difference (VR1-VR2) increases; however a shareholder pact 
tends to offset this negative effect. This countervailing effect is greater if the large 
shareholders act in concert (validation of hypothesis H2). The hypothesis H1 is invalidated, 
which leads to analyse the agreements as coordination tools rather than expropriation 
mechanisms. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Using a sample of 300 French listed firms, I analyse shareholder agreements within 
complex ownership structures (i.e. ownership structures that involve at least two large 
shareholders). The main finding is that the shareholder agreements tend to mitigate the 
conflict that could arise from a large dispersion of powers across large shareholders. A 
possible interpretation is that shareholder agreements act as an efficient coordination 
mechanism preventing an extraction of private benefits by the largest shareholder. 
Shareholder agreements possibly force the first shareholder to take into account the 
expectations of her partners and hence to limit her expropriating behaviour. 
                                                 
17 Further details about Shapley value can be found in Zingales (1994) or Nenova (2003). See also Leech (2002) 
and Prigge (2007) for a discussion about the relevance of this index.    26
Be that as it may, this paper highlights the value of devoting considerable attention to this 
special governance issue. Many questions indeed arise from the empirical evidence. Why do 
some large shareholders choose to be kept together by an explicit agreement whereas others 
do not? Are financial decisions of firms controlled by coalitions of shareholders different 
from those of other firms? Should the agreement be analysed as an endogenous process that 
emerges in response to a special environment? All of these questions seem promising avenues 
for further research. 
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  Shareholder X (Y) wishing to sell her shares is required to offer these 




emptive buying right 
PREUNI 
  Similar to mutual pre-emptive except that only one of the contracting 
parties grants to others the priority buying rights of her shares. For instance 




(often referred as tag 
along right) 
  In case shareholder X (Y) sells her stake to a third party T, shareholder Y 
(X) has the right to join the deal and sell her shares at the same price and 
conditions X (Y) obtained. As for pre-emptive right, this clause can be 
mutual or unilateral.  
 
FLOOR    Contracting shareholder is committed not to let her percentage of shares 
and/or voting rights pass below an ex-ante defined threshold (floor). 
 
CAP    Contracting shareholder is committed not to let her percentage of shares 





  According to this clause, contracting shareholders are protected against the 
dilution of their voting power. For instance shareholder X agrees not to 







  Shareholder X (Y) agrees to favour the election of shareholder Y (X) as 
member of the board of directors. The allocation of board seats can also be 
prescribed by such a provision. 
 




  Shareholders X and Y are kept together by a concerted action, moreover a 
clause specifies the situations in which this concerted action emerges (e.g. 
before any important financial operation, in case of a hostile takeover, 




  No explicit agreement exists between shareholder X and shareholder Y but 







  This category pools all the clauses that are likely to ensure a harmonious 
functioning of the agreement: nomination of a “manager” (whose role is to 
make sure that each contracting shareholder respects her obligations), 
nomination of a referee in case of disagreement… 
 
TERMINATION    Situations that will lead to the termination of the agreement are listed ex-
ante.  For instance, the termination of the shareholder pact can be imposed 
in case of a shareholder passing below a defined threshold. 
 
GOVERNANCE    This category pools all the clauses that prescribe actions likely to enhance 
the governance of the company: creation of an audit committee, withdrawal 
of double voting rights… 
   28
Appendix B: an instance of shareholder agreement 
(source : L’Oréal’s investors website, www.loreal-finance.com) 
 
(Here: simplified version of the provisions. Source: press release, February 3
rd, 2004) 
-  The Bettencourt family and Nestlé have agreed to keep all of their L’Oréal shares for a 
period of 5 years […]. However, should there be a public tender offer for L’Oréal shares 
by a third party, the Bettencourt family and Nestlé would have the right to tender their 
shares or to make a counter-offer. 
-  The Bettencourt family and Nestlé have agreed not to increase, either directly or 
indirectly, their respective shareholdings in L’Oréal, during the lifetime of Mrs. Liliane 
Bettencourt, and in any case during a period of at least 3 years […]. 
-  The Bettencourt family and Nestlé have mutually agreed to mutual rights of pre-emption 
on their respective shareholdings in L’Oréal for a period of 10 years. The Bettencourt 
family has the option of substituting a third party, notably L’Oréal. 
-  A shareholders meeting will be asked to approve the nomination of three board members 
designated by the Bettencourt family and three board members designated by Nestlé […]. 
At the board of directors of L’Oréal, the election of 2 Vice Chairmen, one nominated by 
the Bettencourt family and one nominated by Nestlé will also be proposed. 
-  The Board of Directors of L’Oréal will also be asked to create a Committee for Strategy 
and Implementation, made up of 6 members, including the CEO of L’Oréal who will be 
Chairman. 2 members of this committee will be proposed by the Bettencourt family, 2 by 
Nestlé and 1 independent board member will also be included. It will meet 6 times a year. 
As in the case of the other Board committees, it will have a role of advice and 
recommendation, with the Board retaining all of its responsibilities. 
 
(Other elements from the 2004 annual report) 
Duration 
Unless otherwise stipulated, the Agreement will remain in force for five years from April 29
th 
2004, and in all cases until a period of six months has elapsed after the death of Mrs 
Bettencourt. 
 
Concerted action between the parties 
The parties have declared that they will act in concert for a period of five years from April 
29
th 2004 onwards.   29
Appendix C: Definition of the variables used in the study 
 
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q   =  (Total  Assets  –  Book  Value of Common Equity + Market 
Capitalisation) / Total Assets 
Control variables (Source : DATASTREAM / WORLDSCOPE) 
SIZE  = Log (Total Assets expressed in millions euros) 
GROWTH  = [Net Sales(t) / Net Sales(t-1) – 1 ] for year t 
LEVERAGE  = Total Debts / Total Assets. Total Debts is the sum of long and short 
term debts. 
TANGIBILITY  = Tangible Assets / Total Assets. Tangible assets is proxied by the item 
“Property, plants and equipments”. 
Ownership variables (Source: Firms’ annual reports) 
CFR1 (2) (3)  Cash Flow Rights of the first (second) shareholder. If there is no large 
shareholder with at least 10% of the voting rights, 
CFR1=CFR2=CFR3=0. The calculation of these variables is made at the 
10% and 20% thresholds. 
VR1 (2) (3)  Voting rights of the first (second) (third) shareholder. Zero if no large 
shareholder.  The calculation of these variables is made at the 10% and 
20% thresholds. 
VR1  -  VR2  The difference between voting rights of the first and the second 
shareholders. Computed if there are at least two large shareholders, 0 
otherwise. 
SV1   Shapley value of the voting rights of the first shareholder. Zero if there is 
no large shareholder. 
SV2  Shapley value of the voting rights of the second shareholder. Zero if there 
is no large shareholder and zero if the first shareholder holds a percentage 
of voting rights greater than 50%. 
SV1  -  SV2  The difference between Shapley values of the first and the second 
shareholder. Computed if there are at least two large shareholders, 0 
otherwise. 
Ownership dummy variables (Source: Firms’ annual reports and AMF website). 
AGREEMENT  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there are two large 
shareholders (each holding at least 10% of voting rights) bound by a 
shareholder agreement; 0 otherwise. 
CONCERT  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there are two large 
shareholders kept together by a concerted action; 0 otherwise.  
FI.AGREEMENT  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there are two large 
shareholders kept together by an explicit agreement (for instance a simple 
pre-emptive buying right) but not by a concerted action; 0 otherwise. 
SAME TYPE  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the two large shareholders are 
of the same type (e.g. two families), 0 otherwise. 
LOW CONTES  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if VR1-VR2>0.1403.   30
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
In panel A, the 1576 observations of the sample are classified by sectors (rows) and years (columns). For each combination Year/Sector, the average Tobin’s Q is given. 
There are 7 sectors corresponding to 7 one-digit SIC codes since financial sector (SIC 6) is excluded. 
Q is calculated as the ratio [(Assets - Book value of common equity + Market capitalization) / Assets]; SIZE as the logarithm of total assets (expressed in millions euros); 
GROWTH for year t as the growth rate of net sales between years t-1 and t; LEVERAGE as the ratio of the sum of long and short term debts on total assets; and 
TANGIBILITY as the ratio of Tangible Assets on Total Assets. CFR1 (VR1) represents the cash-flow rights (voting rights) of the largest shareholder. Both variables take a 
value of 0 if there is no large shareholder owning at least 10% of the voting rights. Both variables are computed at the 20% threshold. VR2 is the ultimate voting rights of the 
second largest shareholder (at the 20% threshold). The variable VR1 – VR2 takes a value of 0 if the firm does not have at least two large shareholders. 
 
Panel A : Classification by sectors and years 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  Sample 
Sector  n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean %  of  Total 
1  9 1,33  10  1,22 8 1,23 8 1,31 8 1,94  10  1,61  53  1,44  3,4% 
2  43 1,65 47 1,76 42 1,52 42 1,59 41 1,66 41 1,63  256  1,64  16,2% 
3  59 1,88 63 1,57 62 1,22 63 1,39 64 1,51 61 1,63  372  1,53  23,6% 
4  24 2,58 27 1,66 27 1,50 25 1,67 26 1,58 28 1,68  157  1,77  10,0% 
5  50 1,71 55 1,47 54 1,33 52 1,36 49 1,40 45 1,48  305  1,46  19,4% 
7  47 3,02 54 1,78 54 1,31 54 1,59 52 1,69 48 1,70  309  1,83  19,6% 
8  16 3,51 21 2,51 22 1,31 22 1,56 22 1,63 21 1,85  124  1,99  7,9% 
Total  248 2,17 277 1,69 269 1,34 266 1,49 262 1,58 254 1,64  1576  1,65  100% 
%  of  Total  15,7%  17,6%  17,1%  16,9%  16,6%   16,1%  100%     
 
Panel B : Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis 
  Mean Median  Min  Max Std  Dev. 
Q  1,648 1,335 0,577 7,555 0,978 
SIZE  2,927 2,764 0,997 5,228 0,852 
GROWTH 0,155  0,069  -1,000  10,184  0,463 
LEVERAGE  0,246 0,244 0,000 1,690 0,168 
TANGIBILITY 0,204  0,157 0,004 0,966 0,174 
CFR1  0,347 0,313 0,000 0,994 0,240 
VR1  0,443 0,425 0,000 1,000 0,263 
VR1 - CFR1  0,095  0,072  -0,078  0,583  0,109 
VR2  0,073 0,000 0,000 0,473 0,105 
VR1  -  VR2  0,070 0,000 0,000 0,664 0,137   
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Table 2: Ownership structures 
I allow for three types of ownership structures: Widely Held (no shareholder with at least 10% of the voting rights), One Controlling Shareholder (only one large 
shareholder with at least 10% of the voting rights) and Multiple Large Shareholders (at least two large shareholders, each of them owning at least 10% of the voting rights). 
CFR [VR] (1), (2), (3) denotes the cash flow [voting] rights of the first (second) (third) large shareholder. These variables are computed at the 20% threshold. Average and 
median values (in parentheses) are given. 
AGREEMENT takes a value of one if the two largest blockholders are kept together by an explicit shareholder agreement (whatever its type) and 0 otherwise. CONCERT 
takes a value of one if the two largest blockholders are kept together by a concerted action and 0 otherwise. FI.AGREEMENT takes a value of one if the large shareholders 
are bound by a shareholder pact which is not constitutive of concerted action. 
 
Ownership Structure  Prevalence  Equity Ownership and Control (%) 
     n %  sample  CFR1 VR1 CFR2 VR2 CFR3 VR3 
Widely  Held  148  9,4%  - - - - - - 
          - - - - - - 
One  Controlling  Shareholder  836  53,0%  43,72  56,45  - - - - 
          (46,60)  (63,21)  - - - - 
Multiple Large Shareholders  592  37,6% 30,71 38,12 16,07 19,37  2,75  3,34 
         (29,41) (34,4) (14,25)  (16,90)  (0)  (0) 
  - of which 2 large  456  28,9%  32,92  40,33  15,90  19,32  -  - 
          (31,70) (39,68) (13,31) (16,42)  -  - 
  -  of  which  3  large  124  7,9% 23,56 31,03 16,85 19,80 11,84 14,63 
          (23,46) (30,36) (16,45) (18,83) (10,82) (13,47) 
  - of which 4 or more large  12  0,8%  20,59  27,68  14,37  16,75  13,26  13,62 
         (19,72) (26,45) (15,63) (15,86) (13,09) (12,66) 
  -  of  which  AGREEMENT  259  16,4%        
  -  of  which  CONCERT  227  14,4%        
  -  of  which  FI.AGREEMENT  32  2,0%        
Total  1576  100%  34,73  44,27  6,04 7,28 1,03 1,26 
             (31,29)  (42,50)  (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)   
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Table 3: Shareholder agreements’ clauses 
In my total sample, 259 firm-years have at least two large blockholders who are kept together by a shareholder agreement. 
These 259 “agreement-years” correspond to 93 original shareholder agreements’ filings. Following appendix A, the 
clauses (panel A) and the combinations of these clauses (panel B) are described.  The sample of 93 agreements is also 
subdivided in order to distinguish agreements that specify “concerted action” (CONCERT) and agreements that do not 
(FI. AGREEMENT). 
Explanations for panel A: when a financial (management) (miscellaneous) provision is in force, Financial (Management) 
(Miscellaneous) Provision takes a value of one. Number of Provisions is the sum of the dummy variables related to each 
clause. (e.g. if a mutual pre-emptive right and an anti-dilution clause are observed then Financial Provision=1 and Number 
of Provisions=2). 
Explanations for panel B: I allow for three categories of clauses (Financial/management/miscellaneous) and analyse their 
combinations. For instance, in 22% of the cases of concerted action, the agreement simultaneously contains a financial 
clause and a management clause. 
 






Financial provision  78%  75%  100% 
PREMUT  Mutual pre-emptive buying right  49% 48% 58% 
PREUNI  Unilateral pre-emptive buying right  18% 15% 42% 
CAP  A clause specifies a cap for the percentage 
of cash flow or voting rights  26% 26% 
 
25% 
FLOOR  A clause specifies a floor for the 
percentage of cash flow or voting rights   45% 44% 
 
50% 
JOINT  Joint exit (tag-along right)  28% 30% 17% 
DILUTION Anti-dilution  protection  10% 10%  8% 
  Number of Provisions: Mean (Median) 1.76 (2.00)  1.73 (2.00)  2.00 (2.00) 
Management provision  81%  84%  50% 
SIMPLE 
CONCERT 
There is no formal agreement but the 





BOARD  A certain number of board seats is granted 





CASES  The agreement specifies ex-ante the 
situations in which a concerted action is 







  Number of Provisions: Mean (Median) 1.03 (1.00)  1.10 (1.00)  0.5 (1) 
Miscellaneous Provisions  43%  42%  50% 
CONTROL  Clauses that are likely to ensure a smooth 







A clause specifies situations that will lead 







A clause specifies an improvement of 





  Number of Provisions: Mean (Median) 0.60 (0.00)  0.58 (0.00)   0.75 (0.50) 
      
Panel B: Combination of provisions     
One type  35%  37%  25% 
Only financial clause  14% 12% 25% 
Only management clause  20% 23%  0% 
Only miscellaneous clause  1% 1% 0% 
Two types  27%  25%  42% 
Financial & Management  23% 22% 25% 
Financial & Miscellaneous  4% 3%  17% 
Management & Miscellaneous  0% 0% 0% 
Three types  38%  38%  33%   
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Table 4: Agreements and stakes of the largest blockholders 
The sample consists of 592 firm-years whose ownership structure is “complex” (i.e. with at least two large 
shareholders holding at least 10% of voting rights). This sample is divided according to the existence of a 
shareholder pact between the two largest shareholders. CFR[VR]1(2) denotes the ultimate cash flow (voting) 
rights of the first (second) shareholder at the 20% threshold.  
Student t-statistics and Wilcoxon Z-statistics test for the difference in means (medians) between the two 
categories. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 




Test for  
Diff. in 




CFR1 0,315  0,314  0,301  0,259  1,105  2,624  *** 
VR1 0,393  0,386  0,372  0,330  1,551  2,966  *** 
CFR2  0,176  0,163  0,149  0,128  4,123 ***  4,884 *** 
VR2  0,217  0,202  0,175  0,155  6,742 ***  7,171 *** 
CFR1+CFR2  0,491  0,502  0,450  0,430  2,769 ***  3,369 *** 
VR1+VR2  0,610  0,611  0,548  0,514  4,130 ***  4,380 *** 
VR1-VR2 0,175  0,164  0,197  0,138  -1,579  0,956   
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Table 5: Types of the two largest shareholders 
From the whole sample I sort the 592 firm-years having at least two shareholders, each holding at least 10% of 
voting rights. In panel A, the types of each shareholder are analysed at the 20% threshold and classified into 
five groups: FAMILY (individuals), STATE,  FINANCIAL (a financial company with no controlling 
shareholder at the 20% threshold), WHCO (a non financial firm with no controlling shareholder at the 20% 
threshold) and MISC (miscellaneous, for instance employees or non profit organisation…). The column 
headings provide information on the type of the largest shareholder; the row headings display the type of the 
second shareholder. Statistics are in number and percentages. 
In panel B, two groups are created: (1) firms whose two largest blockholders are of the same type and (2) firms 
whose two largest shareholders are of different types. Definitions for each of the clauses are given in appendix 
A. Student t-statistics test for the difference in means between the two categories. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
Panel A : Types of the largest blockholders 
  The largest blockholder is :   
 FAMILY  STATE  FINANCIAL WHCO  MISC  TOTAL 
n 376  65  71  50  30  592 
% of Total  63,5%  11,0%  12,0%  8,4%  5,1%  100% 
           
Second largest blockholder is :        
FAMILY 241  13  42  28  15  339 
STATE 7  13 4 7  5  36 
FINANCIAL 61  10  17  10  2  100 
WHCO 31  22 1  0 6  60 
MISC 36  7  7  5  2  57 
            
FAMILY 64,1%  20,0% 59,2% 56,0%  50,0%  57,3% 
STATE 1,9%  20,0%  5,6%  14,0%  16,7%  6,1% 
FINANCIAL 16,2%  15,4%  23,9% 20,0% 6,7% 16,9% 
WHCO 8,2%  33,8%  1,4%  0,0%  20,0%  10,1% 
MISC 9,6%  10,8%  9,9%  10,0%  6,7%  9,6%   
 










AGREEMENT 259  0,546  0,345  0,201  5,008  *** 
CONCERT 227  0,527  0,260  0,267  6,921  *** 
FI.AGREEMENT 32  0,018  0,085  -0,066  -3,590  *** 
          
FINANCIAL PROVISION  191 0,370  0,282 0,088  2,285  ** 
PREMUT 130  0,282  0,166  0,116  3,424  *** 
PREUNI 38  0,048  0,078  -0,031  -1,522 
CAP 55  0,040  0,138  -0,098  -4,131  *** 
FLOOR 96  0,136  0,185  -0,049  -1,627 
JOINT 57  0,143  0,056  0,086  3,586  *** 
DILUTION 14  0,018  0,028  -0,010  -0,789 
MANAGEMENT PROVISION  175 0,344  0,254 0,090  2,411  ** 
SIMPLE CONCERT  36  0,092  0,034  0,057  2,913 *** 
BOARD 98  0,128  0,197  -0,069  -2,267  ** 
CASES 93  0,201  0,119  0,082  2,758  *** 
MISCELANEOUS PROVISION  88 0,132  0,163  -0,031  -1,061 
CONTROL 25  0,029  0,053  -0,024  -1,447 
TERMINATION 62  0,070  0,135  -0,065  -2,593  *** 
GOVERNANCE 33  0,070  0,044  0,026  1,359   
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Table 6: Shareholder agreements and dispersion of voting stakes 
This table presents regressions of Tobin’s Q on ownership variables and various control variables for the total sample and two subsamples. The dependent variable in all models is Tobin’s Q, 
measured as market value of equity plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by book value of total assets.  CFR[VR]1 is the ultimate percentage of cash-flow 
[voting] rights of the first shareholder. VR2 is the ultimate percentage of voting rights of the second largest shareholder and is set equal to 0 if the firm does not have at least two large 
shareholders. CFR1, VR1, VR2 are calculated at the 20% threshold. LOW CONTES is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if VR1-VR2 is greater than 14.03%. The dummy variable 
AGREEMENT indicates whether the two large shareholders are signatories to a shareholder agreement (whatever its type). SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; GROWTH is the percentage 
change in sales year on year; LEVERAGE is total financial debt over total assets; and TANGIBILITY is the ratio property, plants and equipments/total assets.  
All regressions are OLS regressions which include year and industry indicators. n is the number of firm-year observations. All t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s 
(1980) correction and are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
CFR1  -0.162 * 
(-1.783) 








VR1-CFR1  -0.622 *** 
(-4.082) 








VR1-VR2  -0.568 *** 
(-3.568) 
 -0.835  *** 
(-4.475) 




AGREEMENT     -0.039 
(-0.341) 
    




   
(VR1-VR2)*(1-AGREEMENT)      -0.826  *** 
(-4.435) 
   
LOW CONTES   -0.165  *** 
(-2.808) 
     
LOW CONTES*AGREEMENT        -0.077 
(-0.954) 
  
LOW CONTES*(1-AGREEMENT)        -0.240  *** 
(-3.081) 
  






































































n =  1576  1576  1576  1576  1576  259  333 
R² 0.222  0.214  0.225  0.225  0.215  0.263  0.285 
Adjusted R²  0.213  0.206  0.215  0.215  0.207  0.208  0.244     39 
Table 7: Characteristics of the agreements 
This table presents regressions of Tobin’s Q on ownership variables and various control variables for the total sample. The dependent variable in all models is Tobin’s Q, measured as market 
value of equity plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by book value of total assets.  CFR[VR]1 is the ultimate percentage of cash-flow [voting] rights of the 
first shareholder. VR2 is the ultimate percentage of voting rights of the second largest shareholder and is set equal to 0 if the firm does not have at least two large shareholders. CFR1, VR1, 
VR2 are calculated at the 20% threshold. The dummy variable AGREEMENT indicates whether the two large shareholders are signatories to a shareholder agreement (whatever its type). The 
dummy variable CONCERT indicates whether the two large shareholders act in concert. The dummy variable FI.AGREEMENT indicates whether the two large shareholders are signatories 
to a simple financial agreement. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; GROWTH is the percentage change in sales year on year; LEVERAGE is total financial debt over total assets; and 
TANGIBILITY is the ratio property, plants and equipments/total assets. All regressions are OLS regressions which include year and industry indicators. In regressions (4) to (6), the impact of 
certain clauses is evaluated. FI.CLAUSE indicates whether the pact contains a financial clause. PRE indicates whether a pre-emptive buying right is in force, BOARD indicates whether a 
provision regarding board representation is in force. 
n is the number of firm-year observations. All t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) correction and are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 






  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 




































(VR1-VR2)*CONCERT  0.805 ** 
(2.450) 
       
(VR1-VR2)*(FI.AGREEMENT)  0.204 
(0.492) 
       
(VR1-VR2)*SAME TYPE   0.929  *** 
(3.440) 
    
(VR1-VR2)*CONCERT*SAME TYPE     1.265  *** 
(3.536) 
    
(VR1-VR2)*CONCERT*(1-SAME TYPE)     0.979  * 
(1.946) 
    
(VR1-VR2)*(1-CONCERT)*SAME TYPE     0.964  *** 
(2.661) 
    























(1.913)   40 
















































n =  1576  1576  1576  1576  1576  1576 
R² 0.225  0.227  0.229  0.227  0.228  0.225 
Adjusted R²  0.215  0.218  0.219  0.217  0.218  0.216   
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Table 8: Robustness checks 
This table presents regressions of Tobin’s Q on ownership variables and various control variables for the total sample. Regressions (1) to (3) are OLS regressions whereas regressions (4) to (7) 
are panel specifications (with fixed effects). The dependent variable in all models is Tobin’s Q, measured as market value of equity plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, 
all divided by book value of total assets.  CFR[VR]1 is the ultimate percentage of cash-flow [voting] rights of the first shareholder. VR2 is the ultimate percentage of voting rights of the second 
largest shareholder and is set equal to 0 if the firm does not have at least two large shareholders. CFR1, VR1, VR2 are calculated at the 10% threshold in regression (1) and (7) whereas the 
calculation is made at the 20% threshold in regressions (2) to (6). SV1 (2) is the Shapley value for the votes of the first (second) shareholder. The dummy variable AGREEMENT indicates 
whether the two large shareholders are signatories to a shareholder agreement (whatever its type). The dummy variable CONCERT indicates whether the two large shareholders act in concert. 
The dummy variable FI.AGREEMENT indicates whether the two large shareholders are signatories to a simple financial agreement. MAJORITY takes a value of one if the first shareholder 
holds more than 50% of the voting rights; WIDELY HELD takes a value of one if the firm does not have any shareholder with at east 10% of the voting rights. SIZE is the logarithm of total 
assets; GROWTH is the percentage change in sales year on year; LEVERAGE is total financial debt over total assets; and TANGIBILITY is the ratio property, plants and equipments/total 
assets. OLS regressions include year and industry indicators. n is the number of firm-year observations. All t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) correction and 
are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
Specification  OLS  PANEL : FIXED EFFECTS 
Threshold 10%  20%  20%  10% 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 




























VR1-VR2  -0.731 *** 
(-3.987) 







VR1/VR2   -0.085  *** 
(-4.549) 
     
SV1-SV2     -0.337  *** 
(-4.096) 
    -0.308  *** 
(-2.813) 
(VR1-VR2)*AGREEMENT  0.602 ** 
(2.010) 
     0.837  ** 
(2.357) 
  
(VR1/VR2)*AGREEMENT   0.059  ** 
(1.964) 
     
(SV1-SV2)*AGREEMENT     0.444  ** 
(2.210) 
    0.250  ** 
(2.048) 
(VR1-VR2)*CONCERT         0.934  *** 
(2.632) 
 
(VR1-VR2)*FI.AGREEMENT         0.157 
(0.215) 
 
WIDELY HELD   0.012 
(0.118) 
     
MAJORITY   0.037 
(0.379) 
       42 






























































    
n  =  1576 1576 1576  1576 1576  1576  1576 
R²  0.223 0.225 0.224  0.626 0.627  0.627  0.627 
Adjusted  R²  0.213 0.215 0.214  0.536 0.537  0.537  0.536   
 
 